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Abstract
In this paper we present results of simulations in which we use a gen-
eral probabilistic learning model to describe the behavior of heterogeneous
agents in a non-cooperative game where it is rewarding to be in the minor-
ity group. The chosen probabilistic model belongs to a well-known class of
learning models developed in evolutionary game theory and experimental
economics, which have been widely applied to describe human behavior
in experimental games.
We test the aggregate properties of this population of agents (i.e., pres-
ence of emergent cooperation, asymptotic stability, speed of convergence
to equilibrium) as a function of the degree of randomness in the agents'
behavior. In this way we are able to identify what properties of the system
are sensitive to the precise characteristics of the learning rule and what
properties on the contrary can be considered as \generic" features of the
game.
Our results indicate that, when the degree of \inertia" of the learning
rule increases, the market reaches a higher level of allocative and infor-
mational eciency, although on a longer time scale.
1 Introduction
In this paper we make a rst attempt to investigate if and how alternative hy-
potheses about learning may inuence the aggregate long-term properties of a
simple non-cooperative game. The general framework analyzed is a multi-agent
game called the "Minority game", whose structure is intended to capture, al-
though in a highly stylized and abstract way, some basic properties of speculative
market interactions.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
In the \original" version of this game, rst introduced by [1], a population
of N articial agents (where N is an odd number) must each simultaneously and
independently choose between two sides, say 0 and 1. The side chosen by the
minority of the agents, i.e. the \minority" side is the winner, and agents who
choose it are awarded one point each, while those who choose the majority side
win nothing. Each agent is initially endowed with a xed number of strategies
(which will be dened more in detail later), and updates them throughout the
game according to a deterministic algorithm.
The game intends to reproduce, at least in rst approximation, the core of
speculation activities in nancial markets, where agents form beliefs about the
market future outcomes (determined by the behavior of the majority of agents
operating on it) and try to "beat" it by acting in an opposite way. This type
of speculative activity is sometimes referred to in the nancial literature as
"contrarian investment strategy", meaning the practice of trying to speculate
on perceived investor sentiment [11]. From a game-theoretic point of view, the
game is a multi-agent coordination game with several asymmetric equilibria
in pure strategies, and a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. As
the population playing a minority game is supposed to be generally large as
to have no chance to communicate, one can investigate the conditions under
which repeated interaction among players cause some forms of aggregate self-
organization to emerge spontaneously. The major results already obtained in
this vein will be discussed later in the section.
Besides simulation studies, some experimental studies have also been con-
ducted on similar types of coordination games[2] The data coming from experi-
ments suggest that the degree of self-organization generally depends on the char-
acteristics of the game being played in terms of, e.g., payo function, amount of
information available to players, number of repetitions and size of the popula-
tion. These variables, in fact, not only modify the incentive structure involved
but, more importantly, determine the type of adaptive behavior (or learning)
that players will exhibit throughout the game. This latter point is especially
relevant in the context of a multi-agents game of the "minority" type, where
the kind of adaptive dynamics and, to a lesser extent, the information available
to agents are likely to substantially modify both the long-term outcome and the
\collective" adjustment process itself.
Our scope in this paper is to study the variation of the asymptotic proper-
ties and dynamics of a population playing a minority game when the learning
rule of the agents is modied. In particular,we adopt a probabilistic learning
algorithm for the agents and leave any other parameter of the original game
unmodied. The choice to adopt a probabilistic learning rule is supported by
the available evidence on human learning in games, which suggests that learn-
ing processes in various interactive contexts can be quite accurately described
by simple probabilistic models [6, 4, 5]. We demonstrate that such simple
variation in the agents' learning algorithm produces important modications
to the asymptotic properties of the system, suggesting that some features of
the original game are not generally valid but strongly depend on the particular
behavioral assumptions made.
In particular, such modications all yield improvements in the system asymp-
totic performance; the improvement is highest for certain values of the game pa-
rameters and for higher degrees of "inertia" in the learning algorithm (measured
by a parameter ), although at the expense of a longer adjustment phase.
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The remainder of the section briey illustrates the basic features of the orig-
inal game, and describes the major results of the system asymptotic properties
present in the literature. Section 2 introduces the probabilistic learning rule
adopted for our simulations, and introduces the inertial parameter .
In section 3 the length of the "training phase" is analyzed. In fact, although
we are mainly concerned with studying the system optimality properties in
the long run, a non secondary aspect concerns the duration of the adjustment
phase, which is generally increased by the introduction of a probabilistic rule.
The \transient length" issue, although primarily a technical one, has important
theoretical implications for our model, in that it highlights a tradeo between
longer times and better performances, which is common to all probabilistic
search algorithms.
We subsequently analyze the system aggregate performance and in doing
so we dene several measures of eciency. Section 4 denes the notion of
"allocative eciency" as in [1, 3], strictly connected to the size of the minority;
in fact, the smaller is the winning minority the more points are "left on the
table" instead of being distributed over the population. The inuence of the
parameter  on the degree of the system allocative eciency is analyzed. We
then compare the degree of eciency so obtained with the level of eciency
theoretically attainable by perfectly rational and perfectly informed players who
"solve" the game analytically.
Section 5 analyzes the eect of  on the degree of "informational eciency",
connected to the existence of arbitrage opportunities. At the end of this sec-
tion, we analyze the inuence of  on the system's degree of social optimality
(uniformity of earnings ditribution over the population). Finally, Appendix A
analyzes modications to our results when a time discounting factor is added
to the learning algorithm.
The results obtained in the various sections are strongly consistent and show
that the introduction of randomness in the learning rule has a positive eect
on all the three types of eciency introduced. Besides, such positive eect is
greater the greater amount of "inertia" is assumed. Section 6 contains some
nal remarks and suggestions for future research.
Let us start our analysis by briey recalling the basic features of the \origi-
nal" game.
In this game [1] all players after each round know only which side (0 or 1)
was the winner, without knowing the actual \size" of the minority. The market
signal is represented by the (history)H of the game, that is a time series modeled
as a binary string specifying which side has won at every stage. The degree of
rationality of the agents is determined once for all by the specication of two
parameters homogeneous over all the population.
The rst parameter is the amount of \memory"of the past that agents are
able to retain, corresponding to the last m bits h
m
of the game history H . The
second parameter is the number s of strategies assigned to each agent.
A strategy is dened as a prescription on the action to take on the next round
of play (i.e. to choose 0 or 1) after a particular history (that is, a particular
sequence of m bits) has been observed up to that point. For example, in the
simple case in which m = 3, a strategy is dened as follows:
that is, the \history" columns specify all the possible histories of the game
in the last m periods; the \prediction" columns specify which action to choose
on the next trial in correspondence to each particular history observed. The
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history prediction history prediction
000 1 100 1
001 0 10001 0
010 0 110 1
011 1 111 0
Table 1: Example of strategy with m = 3.
strategies are randomly drawn from a common pool consisting of the 2
2
m
ways of
assigning all the 2
m
possible strings of lengthm to an action. Note that even ifm
and s are the same for all the population, heterogeneity follows from the random
initial strategy assignment. Each strategy in play will be characterized by a
value q
i
(t), which indicates the total number of points accumulated by strategy
i at time t. Indeed, after each period of the game, all the strategies that have
predicted correctly in that period (that is, all strategies prescribing the side ex
post resulting the winning side) are assigned one point each. In other words, all
strategies which, if played, would have been winning on a particular round, are
all updated regardless of whether they were actually played or not. Note that the
procedure of strengthening strategies that were successful in the past certainly
sounds plausible and it is also the core of the so called \reinforcement learning"
algorithms, which are widely used to model agents behavior in low-rationality,
low-information environments. However, unlike the original minority game,
reinforcement learning implies that only strategies that were actually played
get strengthened. The learning rule in the original minority game, hence, diers
from reinforcement learning stricto sensu in assuming on the part of the agents
a higher degree of rationality.
Given strategies and updating rules, behavior at each stage is completely
deterministic, in that each agent at each period plays, among the strategies he
possesses, the one with the highest number of accumulated points.
In order to judge the system's degree of self-organization, it is necessary to
introduce a measure of allocative eciency. A natural candidate is provided by
the average number of players belonging to the winning party. Such quantity
measures the degree to which the system is in equilibrium. In fact, when the
winning party is equal to N=2 the system nds itself in equilibrium in the sense
that no player can do better by unilaterally deviating. Besides, the equilibrium
conguration is also globally ecient, in that the maximum number of play-
ers win and the highest number of points are distributed over the population.
Otherwise if this number is near 0 (or N), few players win and less points are
allocated. Instead of averaging the size of the winning party one can choose
to compute an associated quantity, the mean squared deviation from the half
population . Let N be the number of agents and N
0
(t) the number of agents
attaining side 0 at time step t, then in a given simulation of length T the mean
squared deviation is computed as
 =
1
T
T
X
=0
(N
0
()  
N
2
)
2
: (1)
Note that  is also a measure of the uctuations around the N !=(((N  1)=2)!)
2
game Nash equilibria in which exactly (N   1)=2 players form the winning
1 INTRODUCTION 5
minority.
Before starting to describe the results from the simulations performed in
[1, 3], few remarks are appropriate.
Any simulation depends, other than on the parameters N , m, and s, on
the initial distribution of strategies among agents and on the initial history,
both generated randomly for the system. Therefore, if not stated otherwise,
all the quantities shown in the plots are obtained via an averaging procedure
over 50 independent simulations with randomly generated histories and strat-
egy distributions. This averaging procedure is performed in order to produce
asymptotically stable quantities, i.e. a dierent resampling with dierent initial
histories and strategies will produce an equal \asymptotic" state for the system.
Moreover at the beginning of each simulation the system is left evolving for
a \training phase" of length T
0
in order to eliminate any eventual transient
eect on the subsequent averaging procedure. The quantities so obtained can
be considered \asymptotic" properties of the system as long as T
0
and T are
chosen high enough to provide a good approximation of the T ! 1 limit. As
we will see later, a sensible choice for T and T
0
is far from trivial in a generalized
setting.
The dependence of the volatility  on N , m and s for the original minority
game has been studied in many works [1, 3] and is summarized in Fig. (1) for
s = 2. As noticed by [3] the parameter z = 2
m
=N turns out to be, at least in
rst approximation, the relevant one and the curves for various N collapse if
plotted in this variable. Various explanation of this peculiar feature has been
proposed [1, 3]. Notice that even if the actual number of possible strategies
is 2
2
m
, their relative strengths are completely dened in term of the frequency
P (0jh
m
) with which, in history, a 0 follows a given m length string h
m
and
there are 2
m
of such variables. So, z can be interpreted as the density of agents
in the strategy space degrees-of-freedom.
Looking at Fig. (1) tree dierent \regimes" of the system can be identied:
a \random regime" occurs when z is large (the agent are sparse in the strategy
space), and the system can hardly organize. In fact its behavior can be described
as a collection of random agents that choose their side with a coin toss. In
fact suppose the past history be a given h
m
and suppose there are N
d
(h
m
)
agents whose strategies prescribe dierently based on that history while there
are N
0
(h
m
) and N
1
(h
m
) agents whose strategies prescribe the same party (we
restrict ourselves to the s = 2 case), respectively 0 and 1. If the agent in N
d
choose randomly the variance is (h
m
) = N
d
(h
m
)=4 + (N
0
(h
m
) N
1
(h
m
))
2
=4.
The average over the possible h
m
will then give  = N=4. Notice that there are
two dierent contributions to : a uctuation in the choices of agents able to
choose and a uctuation in the initial distribution of strategies.
The second regime is the \inecient regime" for z << 1. Here the agents
densely populate the strategy space and they in fact \coordinate" in the sense
that their actions are strongly correlated. This coordination however leads to
a worsening of the overall performance due to a \crowd" eect [7]: the agents
in fact are too similar to each other and they tend all to choose the same party
based on the information available.
The third regime for z  1 is where the coordination produces a better-
than-random performance. Here the agents are enough dierentiated so as not
to produce \crowd" eects but suciently distributed over the strategy space
so as not to produce a random-like behavior. The point where  is minimum
2 LEARNING DYNAMICS 6
0.1
1
10
0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100
(z)
z =
2
m
N
N = 101
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
N = 301
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
N = 401
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
N = 201











N = 801
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Figure 1: The volatility (z) for s = 2 and dierent values for N and m
is referred to in the literature as the \critical point" z
c
suggesting that a major
change in the system behavior happens when this point is crossed. As we will
see in the following sections, this \criticality" survives and in some sense more
clearly appears when generalizing the learning rule initially proposed.
From now on we will restrict ourselves to the case N = 101 and s = 2 so we
will speak of the \optimal" value for memory length m
o
referring to the value
of m which minimize 
1
while we prefer to drop the word \critical" as it brings to mind special
features of physical systems which are not clearly perceived in our simulations.
2 Learning dynamics
The notion of strategy in the minority game is relatively unusual in standard
or evolutionary game theory, and it requires some interpretation in terms of
the behavioral and cognitive characteristics of the human players it intends to
describe.
According to us, each strategy may been seen as a particular \mental model"
or \hypothesis" about the world (the "world" may include values of the fun-
damentals of the market in question, or, as it seems appropriate in this case,
the beliefs and behavior of the other players). Each general hypothesis then
translates into specic predictions on which will be the winning action for each
particular history observed so far. In this respect, a strategy in this game re-
sembles the notion of \repeated game strategy" in standard game theory (see,
1
Note that the values chosen for m and N conform to what found in [1, 3]; the choice to
set s=2 is justied by the fact that the system exhibits the same qualitative properties for
any s  2, while reducing to a trivial case for s=1
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e.g.,[13] for an introduction).
Each agent initially has a number of dierent strategies, that is a number of
dierent (and competing) hypotheses. After each period, more evidence is col-
lected and all the hypotheses consistent with the evidence are updated through
a process that is very similar in spirit to Bayesian updating.
From a behavioral point of view, both the denition of strategy and the
choice of the learning rule to adopt are particularly demanding in terms of the
degree of rationality of the agents. In fact, players not only are supposed to
form several hypotheses about the game, but they also update them consis-
tently, de facto applying sophisticated conterfactual forms of reasoning. On the
other hand, as previously stated, literature on experimental games has shown
that behavior of human subjects in games can often be well approximated by
simple adaptive learning rules which act probabilistically. For example, the re-
inforcement learning model [4, 6], originally developed in psychology, has been
shown to accurately describe medium and long run behavior in a large class of
games in which agents have limited information and feedback. A more recent
probabilistic model developed by Camerer [5], more in line with the algorithm
initially proposed for the minority game, extends the updating mechanism also
to actions that were not played but which would have been successful, according
to what he calls the \law of simulated eect".
In the present paper we introduce a simple modication of the standard
learning rule: the updating mechanism is left unaltered (that is, all winning
strategies are updated regardless of whether they were played or not), but the
choice between strategies in each period is probabilistic instead of deterministic.
Remember the denition of q
i
(t) as the total number of points strategy
i would have won if played until time t then each agent chooses among his
strategies based on the following probability distribution:
p
i
(t) =
e
q
i
(t)
P
j
e
q
j
(t)
: (2)
where the sum on j is over all the strategies possessed by the player
2
. Note
that in general, dierent players will assign dierent probabilities to the same
strategy due to a dierent strategy endowment.
Our model bears similarities with a discrete time replicator dynamics [8].
The parameter  can be considered as a sort of \willingness to choose": when
it is high, the agents are sensitive even to little dierences in the virtual score
of their strategies and in the  ! 1 limit the usual minority game rule is
recovered. On the contrary for low values of  a great dierence in strategy
strengths is necessary in order to obtain signicant dierences in probabilities.
The connection of (2) with the replicator dynamics is straightforward if one
looks at the probability updating equation associated with it:
p
i
(t+ 1) = p
i
(t)
e
 q
i
(t)
P
j
p
j
(t)e
 q
j
(t)
: (3)
where q
i
(t) = q
i
(t+1)  q
i
(t) are the points won by strategy i at time t. If one
thinks of a continuous process q
i
(t) = _q
i
(t)t, where _q
i
(t) is the instantaneous
\tness" of strategy i, then the continuous time replicator dynamics equation
is recovered keeping only the rst terms in t expansion.
2
For our s = 2 case, the summation will contain two terms
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Figure 2: The mean  as a function of the run length for dierent m. The points
are averages over a sample of 30 independent runs with N = 101 and s = 2
Let us go back to the problem of dening the correct values for T
0
and T
in (1). The central question is: How long must the system be left evolving
before it reaches the asymptotically stable dynamics? In the minority game
analyses found in the literature [1, 3], the general answer is \long enough", where
\enough" is typically 10:000 to 100:000 time steps for an agents population
ranging from 100 to 1000 units.
Fig. (2) plots the average  value for the original minority game as a function
of the time length T over which this average is taken with a transient T
0
= T . As
it can be seen from the graph, the values used in the literature on the minority
game are generally sucient to obtain a prediction correct to a few percent.
However, two things are worth noticing:
 For low values of m, in the \inecient regime", and for high value of m,
the \random regime",the system reaches a stable dynamic quite fast. On
the contrary, for values of m near the optimal value m
o
, the system takes
a longer time to self-organize.
 The system approaches the asymptotic value from above, which suggests
the intuitive interpretation that the system \learns" to self-organize with
time.
Consider now the case in which the learning rule is the one described in (2).
For high values of  this learning rule approaches the standard one, and ac-
cordingly, the transient length is similar to the one found in the previous case.
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However, as  decreases, such length generally increases. The increase is most
dramatic for values of m near the optimal value m
o
, and it progressively dis-
appears for higher values of m, as can be seen in Fig. (3). Such a result is
somewhat intuitive if one considers the meaning of  in terms of the learning
rule. Supposing a non trivial dynamics for m near m
o
, the parameter  sets the
time scale on which such dynamics is attained.
As a suggestive explanation of the statement above, consider the following
argument:
Let be r(t) = p
1
(t)=p
2
(t) the ratio of the probabilities that an agent asso-
ciates to her two strategies, and q(t) = q
1
(t)   q
2
(t) the dierence in their
respective strengths. From (2) it follows that r(t) = e
q(t)
. Assuming that the
dierence in the two strategies performance holds constant over time, assump-
tion which is generally true in the initial transient regime where agents' behavior
is substantially randomic, we obtain q(t)  t; hence, from the equality above,
a given dierence in probability is obtained at a time which is inversely propor-
tional to .
2
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Figure 3:  as a function of run length T for dierent . The points are average
over a 30 runs sample with a transient time T
0
= T .
In order to estimate the time scale over which stability is attained, we use
the following procedure: Holding all the parameters and the initial conditions
constant, the system volatility can be expressed as a function of both the \tran-
sient" phase duration, and of the time length over which it is averaged, i.e.
 = (T; T
0
).
Starting from a reference time T
r
,
3
we compute the mean volatility progres-
3
Note that the chosen value for T
0
is irrelevant as long as it is small compared to the
typical time scale.
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sively doubling t and t
0
, and thus obtaining a series of values 
n
= (2
n
T
r
; 2
n
T
r
).
When the relative variation j
n
  
n 1
j=
n
falls below a xed threshold ,
we stop and take the last computed value of  as an estimate of its asymptotic
value. The corresponding time length
^
T () will be an estimate of the time
implied by the system to reach this asymptotic stability.
As can be seen in Fig. (3) the increase in
^
T when  is lowered is mainly con-
centrated around m
o
, with shapes that suggest the presence of a discontinuity.
10000
100000
1ε+06
1ε+07
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T
(.
1)
m
β=1
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β=.04
β=.01
β=.0025
Figure 4: A rough estimate of the time
^
T needed by the system to reach the
stable asymptotic  value with an error not greater than a few percent. The
plot is made against m for dierent value of . see the text for a description of
the method.
4 Allocative eciency
In order to analyze the asymptotic properties of (m) for dierent , we use
the same procedure described above regarding the calculation of
^
T , i.e. we leave
the system evolve until stability is reached. The simulation results are plotted
in Fig. (5). As can be seen when  decreases, the system performance level
generally increases. Such increase is larger the lower the value of m, and it
becomes negligible for m  m
0
. The observed behavior is consistent with the
idea that for high values of m, the system dynamics is completely determined
by the initial distribution of strategies among players, and the players have
no opportunities to attain a higher performance by adjusting their behavior.
Therefore, the particular learning rule used is largely irrelevant. On the contrary,
for low values of m, the original learning rule ( = 1) produces a \crowd
eect" [9] (consisting in large groups of agents choosing the same side) that,
due to homogeneity in the initial strategy endowments, prevents the system
from attaining a high degree of eciency.
In some sense, one can interpret the crowd eect as a collective form of
\overreaction" [10]. Of course, introducing a probabilistic learning rule for the
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strategy choice acts like a brake that dumps the amplitude of such correlated
uctuations. At the individual level, this can be interpreted as the presence
of higher degree of \inertia" as agents update their probabilities more slowly.
In other words, as  decreases each agent behaves as if he was applying a
sort of \ctitious play" approximation [?]
4
, indeed assuming stationarity on the
distribution of other agents choices. This assumption is in fact consistent: a
decrease in  makes the behavior of the population as a whole change at a
slower pace.
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Figure 5: The volatility  for s = 2, N = 101 and various m and . The run
are performed doubling the time length T until the last two value are dierent
by less then 1%.
The double eect of a slower probability updating at the individual level and
the resulting more stable collective behavior implies that  is a non increasing
function of . In fact, if the system reaches a dynamical stability via an averag-
ing procedure over the past outcomes, increasing the time scale over which the
averaging procedure is taken cannot rule out previously attainable equilibria.
However, ote that if one performs the simulations with a xed time length,
when  becomes small the system behavior resembles the behavior of a random
system. This nding is due to both the increase in the transient length and the
purely randomic starting dynamics which occur when  is decreased. Here we
are facing a double limiting problem: we are interested in the value of volatility
in both  ! 0 and T ! 1 limit and therefore it is necessary to specify which
limit is taken rst. The results of the xed time simulations are plotted in
Fig. (6) and are in line with [14].
4
Note that ctitious play implies that a player always best responds to the observed fre-
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Figure 6: The volatility  for s = 2, N = 101 and various m and . The runs
are performed with a xed time length T = T
0
= 10000. When  ! 0 the
system approaches a collection of randomly choosing agents.
The performance attainable in the minority game via a dynamical organiza-
tion of agents with limited information and ability to choose is actually surpris-
ingly high, compared to the eciency attainable with more informed and more
rational agents who are endowed with a greater exibility in choice.
Consider for instance a collection of agents characterized, in line with the
original minority game, as follows: each agent is assigned S = 2 strategies, and
a vector of length 2
m
containing the probability p(h
m
) of playing according to
the rst strategy after the appearance of h
m
. Moreover, for each h
m
, each agent
knows the values of N
0
(h
m
), N
1
(h
m
) and N
d
(h
m
) indicating respectively the
number of agents for which their strategies prescribe both to play 0, both to
play 1 or to play dierently.
Assuming that the game structure and the amount of information available
to agents is common knowledge and assuming the agents are perfectly rational
the problem completely factorizes and for each h
m
every agent in N
d
(h
m
) will
solve the game analytically choosing p(h
m
) in order to minimize
(N
1
(h
m
) N
0
(h
m
))
2
  p(h
m
)N
d
(h
m
) (4)
i.e. to make the average value of people choosing a given side nearer to N=2
as possible. This choice will produce a volatility   N
d
=4 = N=8
5
which is
roughly similar to what obtained in simulation Fig. (5) in low m low  region.
quency of opponent's play
5
We are assuming N = N
1
(h
m
)   N
0
(h
m
) < N
d
(h
m
). Notice that for random agents
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Figure 7: The variance of the distribution of  over a sample of 50 independent
runs. As  becomes small the point m  m
0
maintains a signicantly larger
variance.
A nal remark concerns the variance of the distribution of  as a function 
for various m plotted in Fig. (7). The graph shows that when  decreases the
variance of  decreases for any m, however it remains three times greater for
m = m
o
suggesting a stronger dependence of the asymptotic performance on
the initial strategy assignment which the system is not able to rule out.
5 Informational eciency
In this section we analyze the informational content of H , the binary string of
successive winning sides. Relatedly, with informational eciency we mean here
the extent to which the future system outcome is unpredictable, i.e. the absence
of any arbitrage opportunity.
Let p(0jh
l
) be the probability that a 0 follows a given string h
l
of all the
possible 2
l
strings of length l.
The analysis performed in [3], for the original game leads to the identication
of two regimes: a \partially ecient" regime for m < m
o
in which p(0jh
l
) = :5;
as long as l  m; thus no informational content is left for strategies with memory
less or equal to the one used by the agents. For m > m
o
an \inecient" regime
is entered in which the distribution of p(0jh
l
) is not at, even for l  m, meaning
there are \good" strategies that could eventually exploit the market signal to
N 
p
(N) and N
d
 N and we can neglect N=N
d
terms in the solution of (4)when N is
large.
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Figure 8: The probability p(0jh
l
) of obtaining 0 following a given binary string
h
l
in system history for m = 3 and l = m + 1 = 4. When  is reduced the
distribution \atten" and any structure is lost.
obtain higher prots. For l > m both the regions show a non trivial distribution
p(0jh
l
) with an increasing degree of \roughness" as l increases.
The eect of introducing \randomness" through the parameter  leads to
the obvious eect of reducing the \roughness" of p(0jh
l
) (see Fig (8)).
In order to study the behavior of the system as  changes we introduce two
related quantities which can be used to characterize the informational content
of the time series. The rst is the conditional entropy H(l) dened as:
H(l) =  
X
h
l
p(h
l
)
X
i2f0;1g
p(ijh
l
) log p(ijh
l
) (5)
where the summation is intended over all the possible string of length l and
p(h
l
) is the frequency of a given string in the system history H . The maximum
value H(l) = 1 is reached for a at distribution p(0jh
l
) = :5; and is interpreted
as impossibility of forecasting (in probability) the next outcome starting from
the previous l outcomes. The idea that the information content can be used to
\make money" leads us to the denition of a second quantity A(l):
A(l) =
X
h
l
p(h
l
)max fp(0jh
l
); p(1jh
l
)g (6)
which is the average fraction of point won by the best strategy of memory l.
This is a measure of the reward obtained by the best arbitrageur with memory
l ( where if no arbitrage opportunities are present A(l) is equal to :5.)
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Figure 9: The conditional entropy S(l) (left) and arbitrage opportunity A(l)
(right) as a function of time depth l for m = 3 < m
o
.
Before analyzing the behavior of these quantities when  is varied, let us
start by analyzing the properties of a population characterized by the two op-
posite models of \perfectly-informed, perfectly rational agents" and of \random
agents" discussed before.
Under the former characterization the problem factorizes for each past his-
tory and the dependence on m disappears. The history produced by such a
system is a random series of 0 and 1. Indeed the number of agents choosing one
side is distributed according to a binomial around N=2 with dierent widths for
dierent h
m
. This in particular means that in this limit the \memory" loses
any predicting power and no arbitrage opportunity is left for agents with longer
memory, i.e. no residual information is left in the time series and the behav-
ior of agents makes the market perfectly informationally ecient. Under this
assumption we expect S  1 and A  :5.
Under the opposite characterization of \random agents", due to the unbal-
ance in the initial strategies endowment we expect a non trivial structure to
appear for every l; thus S < 1 and A > :5.
In Fig. (9) we plot S(l) and A(l) for histories generated with a value of
m > m
0
, in the \partially ecient" regime. The eect of decreasing  shows
up when l > m but the information content for high l is never completely
eliminated. The market becomes less ecient the larger is the time scale l at
which it is observed. In fact it can be shown under very general assumptions that
certain strings in the history are more abundant than others [3] and the long-
range correlation that was responsible for the \crowd eect" at high  survives
as a non trivial structure in p(0jh
l
) for high l. To an agent with memory l  m
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Figure 10: The conditional entropy S(l) (left) and arbitrage opportunity A(l)
(right) as a function of time depth l for m = 6 > m
o
.
the market appears perfectly ecient regardless of the  value.
For values of m in the \inecient phase" the eect is in some sense reversed.
As can be seen in Fig. (10) the eect of decreasing  is again negligible for
l  m but in the limit  ! 0 the curve becomes at for l > m. This last
result deserves some comments: the atness in l  m means that no gain is
achieved from inspecting the time series with a very long memory l >> m
because no more arbitrage opportunities are open for a smarter (i.e. with a
longer memory) agent than the best possible agent of memory m. The market
can be called again \partially ecient" in the sense that it generates an upper
bound on the maximal attainable arbitrage capability which does not depend
on the arbitrageur memory.
The particular form of the conditional entropy in Fig. (10) suggests that in
the limit  ! 0 the system can be described as a Markov chain of memory
m. Notice that following its very denition, the system is conceived as one in
which the past is not discounted (however, see Appendix A for an analysis of
the system properties when a time discount factor is introduced), in the sense
that agents weigh their strategies on the basis of all the game outcomes starting
from the beginning of the simulation. The present result can be explained by
noticing that when  is small only great dierences in the past performances
of strategies are relevant and in the limit  ! 0 only innite dierences stay
relevant. Stated otherwise, the frequency of victories of the various strategies
becomes constant implying the formation of a static hierarchical structure in
the strategy space which at the end is responsible of the Markov character of
the resulting history.
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Figure 11: For each player we plot the scoring rate of its best strategy toward
its own winning rate. The population is made of 30 independent runs of 101
players. The value of  is :04.
The appearance of \best strategies" in m > m
o
region is supported by
plotting the average points scored by the best strategy versus the average point
scored by the player (see Fig. (11)).
A correlation appears between the performance of a player and the perfor-
mance of its best strategy for m  m
o
. In the m  m
o
region a sub popula-
tion showing the same kind of high correlation coexists with a population that
presents no correlation, constituted of agents possessing two equally performing
strategies.
We can say that the low m region is the one possessing the characteristics
of \social optimality" where no strategies are preferred to others and no player
is bound to lose due only to his initial strategy endowment.
Notice however that perfect equivalence between strategies does not neces-
sarily imply equivalence in agent performances. As a further analysis we have
plotted the variances and the supports of the points distribution for dierent
value of beta and m in Fig. (12). It appears that only for low m and low 
does equivalence in strategy performance imply a more uniform distribution of
points over the population. We can then identity this region with the \socially
optimal" one.
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Figure 12: Variance (rectangle) and support (straight line) for the scored points
distribution on a population of 30 independent runs with N = 101 and s = 2.
Notice that while in the high  simulations the distributions are similar in width
for anym, when  in reduced the lowm region emerges are the \social optimal".
6 Conclusions and Outlook
Our results show that introducing some degree of randomness in the behavior
of the low-rational agents who play the minority game has a positive eect
on performances both in term of allocative and informational eciency. The
system indeed attains better resources exploitation and creates smaller, even if
not negligible, arbitrage opportunities. Moreover the \social optimality" of the
system, expressed as the inverse of the variance or analogously of the support,
of the earnings distribution over the population increases with the \inertia" in
the players behavior.
The major eect of randomness is that of acting like a brake on the system
dynamics, thus preventing groups of players who densely populate the strategy
space from acting in a strongly correlated way and from producing a \crowd"
eect which worsens the system performance. The introduction of randomness
in individual behavior is only one of possible ways to introduce heterogeneity
in players' behavior. For instance, the same eect has been obtained in [15]
substituting the \global" evaluation of strategies on the system history H with
a \personal" evaluation in which each agent uses the binary string made up
of its own record of victories. A \diversication" mechanism is again at work
breaking the correlation among agents.
On the same line it is interesting to analyze the eect on the game of in-
troducing a reinforcement learning model which, due to the \update only what
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you play" prescription, will introduce a personal history for each player which
presumably will unlock the crowd formation. The adoption of a reinforcement
learning model, moreover, would be justied by it being the "zero-level" model
in terms of degrees of rationality and information required, which renders it par-
ticularly well suited to model a wide array of real interactive situations. In fact,
while more sophisticated models may be more easily violated by human players
(and a growing literature indeed demonstrates that they often are), the "law
of eect" underlying reinforcement models is almost never violated by human
subjects. Results obtained by adopting this learning rule should therefore be
considered quite robust. This analysis will be conducted in a forthcoming pub-
lication, together with the exploration of a \linear" model for the assignment of
probability to strategies.
The reason to analyze the system aggregate properties under dierent \learn-
ing rules" is testing the \robustness" of the model: in fact, the characteristics of
the system that are independent or weakly dependent on the particular behavior
of the individual agents can be considered as general features of a multi-agent
system like the minority game. In particular, our modication of the original
model has been in the direction indicated by the experimental literature on
learning in games [4]. From a more theoretical point of view such a study can
be seen as an eort to decouple the peculiar features of a social self-organizing
system from the exact rules governing the individual choices, in the spirit of
trying to identify, at least in rst approximation, the variables that determine
its universality class.
7 Appendix A
Many authors especially in the experimental literature [4] introduce one more
parameter in the description of learning, connected to the idea that agent weigh
more the information they received in the recent past that the one coming from
the far past. This parameter takes typically the form of a discount factor. If

i
(t) are the points scored by strategy i at time t and 0 <   1 the information
discount factor the updating rule for the total strength becomes
q
i
(t+ 1) = q
i
(t) + 
i
(t) (7)
and the associated updating rule for the probabilities:
p
i
(t+ 1) = p

i
(t)
e
q
i
(t)
P
j
p

j
(t)e
q
j
(t)
: (8)
The eect of introducing such a memory leakage is twofold: on one hand it
puts an upper limit to the maximal strength any strategy could reach, namely
1=(1 ), and on the other hand in presence of no information ux the equiprob-
ability between strategies is steadily restored. This eect will implies that if one
takes the  ! 0 limit keeping constant the value of , the system will converge
to a collection of random agents. This can be interpreted saying that agents
have to collect a large amount of information before they start behaving as an
organized collection. The eect of introducing \forgetting" in the learning rule is
easily understood: if the agents forget more rapidly than they learn they are al-
ways bounded to a suboptimal behavior. Indeed ,as can be seen from Fig. (13),
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if the value of  is decreased the optimality of the system is proportionally
reduced.
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Figure 13:  as a function of run length T for dierent values of  and .
The simulations are performed with m = 6 where a greater sensitivity of the
transient time length toward \learning" parameter  and  is expected, see
Sec. (3).
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